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ABSTRACT
In 2001, the Youth Justice Board of England &
Wales introduced the Intensive Supervision and
Surveillance Programme (ISSP). It was quickly
hailed as the most robust community-based sanc-
tion available for the most serious and persistent
young offenders. However, it has been dogged by
high reconviction rates. This paper undertakes
first a review of the international evidence base for
the effectiveness of all types of intensive super-
vision, before focusing specifically on its effective-
ness within youth justice. It then presents our
findings from fieldwork (participant observation,
interviews and questionnaires) carried out within
two Youth Offending Teams, comparing the views
of supervisors and the supervised young offenders.
The conclusions show that ISSP is not founded
on sound evidence. Our own evidence suggests a
number of reasons why ISSP does not work, and
is not likely to, in its present form. Most import-
antly, it is clear that ISSP cannot provide the
level of public protection claimed with such a
severe offending group, and therefore does not aid
the realistic promotion of greater use of commun-
ity sentences. The article makes suggestions for an
alternative approach to dealing with serious and
persistent offenders in the community, based on
the views of the young offenders subject to ISSP
and the staff who supervise them.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2008 independent audit of youth jus-
tice in England and Wales (Solomon &
Garside, 2008), paints as gloomy a picture
of New Labour’s youth justice system as did
the previous Audit Commission Report
(1996), more than a decade before, and
under a Tory government. Most of the
governmental targets have been missed, and
the central aim of the youth justice system,
set out in the Crime and Disorder Act
1998, ‘to prevent offending by young per-
sons’ has yet to be achieved (Solomon &
Garside, p. 65). Within this overall context,
Solomon and Garside's review includes a
specific critique of the Intensive Super-
vision and Surveillance Programme (ISSP),
which is the focus of our independent
study.
The ISSP was introduced in England and
Wales (E&W) in 2001 and by 2005 it had
‘become recognised as the most robust and
innovative community-based programme
available for persistent and serious young
offenders’ (Gray et al., 2005, p. 9). This
view has now become accepted uncritically
by some commentators (see for instance,
Stephenson, Giller, & Brown, 2007). How-
ever, we argue that a 91 per cent reconvic-
tion rate for a disposal aimed at the most
serious young offenders (Gray et al., p. 136)
does not offer effective rehabilitation, or
public protection and reassurance. We
therefore took the failure of ISSP in reduc-
ing overall reoffending as our starting point
so that we could seek explanations for this
disappointing performance. Consequently,
we carried out an in-depth critical exam-
ination of ISSP within two very different
Youth Offending Teams (YOT) throughout
2007, primarily to explore the often over-
looked views of staff and young offenders.
Below, we first review the international
evidence for the effectiveness of all forms of
‘intensive supervision’. We then present our
own research findings on whether ISSP's
poor results reflect poor implementation/
management (and can therefore potentially
be ‘fixed’), or whether ISSP is a concep-
tually flawed intervention that will not
achieve its aims, no matter how well imple-
mented and run.
BACKGROUND AND KEY FEATURES
OF ISSP
ISSP was specifically designed to: bring
structure to offenders’ lifestyles; tackle their
criminogenic factors; and focus on areas
worst affected by street crime (Home
Office, 2002). ISSP is used as an element of
existing disposals, typically, with Detention
and Training Orders, Supervision Orders
and Community Rehabilitation Orders
(Gray et al., 2005, pp. 27–28). Offenders
should receive five core intervention
modules including: education/training;
restorative justice; offending behaviour;
interpersonal skills; and family support;
although other options can be offered.
The framework and delivery of the ISSP
is highly prescriptive (Smith, 2007, p. 126).
Participants can be subject to monitoring
up to 24 hours/7 days a week and should be
subject to at least one form of direct surveil-
lance (tracking; electronic tagging; voice
verification) or intelligence-led policing
(Gray et al., 2005, pp. 28–29). Young
offenders generally spend six months on
ISSP, although there is now a 12-month
version (see Sutherland, Taylor, Gray,
Merrington, & Roberts, 2007). The most
intensive supervision phase (25 hours a
week) is in the first three months, followed
by a minimum of five hours a week and
weekend support for a further three months
(Gray, et al., pp.18–27).
ISSP targets: persistent offenders (those
charged, warned or convicted of offences
committed on four or more separate dates,
who have received at least one previous
community or custodial disposal); serious
offenders (those who would be at risk of a
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custodial sentence of 14 years or more if
they were adults); and those who are at risk
of custody or secure remand due to repeat
offending on bail (Youth Justice Board
[YJB], 2002, p. 5).
The overall aim is to provide a demand-
ing programme to reassure the public. The
Youth Justice Board1 (YJB) therefore set
three key objectives for the programme: to
reduce the reoffending rate by 5 per cent; to
tackle young offenders’ underlying prob-
lems effectively; and to demonstrate that
supervision and surveillance is undertaken
consistently and rigorously (Gray et al.,
2005, p. 27). A further aim has since been
added: to divert young offenders from cus-
tody and reduce the number of under-18s
remanded or sentenced by 10 per cent
(Gray et al., p. 27; YJB, 2003), although
Francis Done, the current chair of YJB, has
admitted that this was too ambitious.
Although ISSP is unique in the current
English youth justice system, it is not the
first community-based intensive supervision
programme to be implemented, and there
was a rich body of international and
domestic evidence available, which we
review below, to inform policy-makers
prior to ISSP’s introduction.
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTENSIVE
SUPERVISION IN THE COMMUNITY:
THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
BASE?
‘Evidence-based practice’ has been a key
discourse in UK criminal justice since the
Inspectorate of Probation’s (HMIP) seminal
‘What Works’ publications of 1998 (see
Chapman & Hough 1998; Ellis & Under-
down, 1998; Ellis & Winstone, 2002). It is
therefore reasonable to expect that the justi-
fication for, and design of, ISSP, is evidence
based, and that it should take account of the
long history of intensive supervision (ISP)
evaluation in the US and UK. It is clear in
reviewing these evaluations that intensive
programmes vary greatly (Smith, 2003,
p. 137), and there is no consensus on how
much more supervision is required before
the programme becomes ‘intensive’ (Enos,
Homan, & Carroll, 1999, p. 27). Further-
more, evaluators have, unsurprisingly, util-
ised various methodologies and sample sizes
(Moore, Gray, Roberts, Taylor, & Merring-
ton, 2006, p. 31). We have therefore
attempted here to take a broad, inclusive
approach to ISP evaluative evidence, but
also ensured that we have focused on apply-
ing the findings in the specific context of
ISSP.
Evidence from the USA
ISP in the USA dates back to the 1960s for
adult offenders, though it was most popular
between 1985 and 1995. Every large
probation area developed programmes of
intensive supervision and/or surveillance
(Petersilia, 1998) and by 1994 it was estim-
ated that 120,000 offenders were on such
programmes (Altschuler, 1998, Corbett &
Petersilia, 1994). Figure 1 summarises the
many studies which have previously
explored the effectiveness of intensive
supervision. Many of these evaluations have
utilised Random Control Trials (RCTs) and
are therefore considered to be of ‘gold
standard’ (Moore et al., 2006, p. 32) and of
achieving the top rated ‘level 5’ for scientific
methodological rigour on the scale adopted
and disseminated by the Home Office
(Friendship, Street, Cann, & Harper, 2004,
p. 7). It is important to consider that the
results of all but one of these studies was
available before the introduction of ISSP in
E&W in 2001 and, as a body of evidence,
provide no support for the further adoption
of intensive supervision.
Having established that there is no firm
evidence base for the effectiveness of intens-
ive supervision from the US (see also
Sherman et al., 1997 for a comprehensive
literature review), we then reviewed the
equivalent evidence from the UK.
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Programme Sample size Offender profiles Programme structure Outcomes
Post-custody parole in
New Jersey (Pearson,
1988)
554 ISP cases & 130
matched comparison
cases
Current offences
generally serious, most
had one prior
conviction, over half
had a drug problem
Average of 31 contacts
in first 6 months.
(Community service,
employment requirement,
counselling/treatment
services, financial payment)
41% ISP cases recalled
to prison before
completion. After 2
years, 12% of ISP group
had an arrest compared
with 23% of comparison
cases. However,
numbers of participants
were not matched
Probation for young
offenders in Michigan
(Barton & Butts, 1990)
Random Assignment of
326 ISP cases & 185
control cases
Average age of 15.4
years, Average of 3.2
prior charges, Current
charge ‘quite serious’ in
approx.50% of cases
A 1 year programme
with an average of 10
contacts per month
(Behavioural supervision,
individual counselling,
school placement assistance,
social skills training)
78% of participants
reappeared in court
during 2-year follow up
Intensive Probation in
California: Contra
Costa, Ventura and Los
Angeles. (Petersilia &
Turner, 1990)
Random assignment of
488 cases (ISP &
control)
More than half
previously incarcerated.
Nearly half had serious
drug-abuse problems,
three-quarters were at
high risk of recidivism
Surveillance-orientated
and participation in
rehabilitative
programmes
In a 1-year follow-up
period, 40% had
technical violations & a
third had new arrests.
There was no significant
difference between ISP
& control groups
Intensive Protective
Supervision Project
(IPSP) in North
Carolina. (Land,
McCall, & Williams,
1990)
Random assignment to
IPSP or control group
Two-thirds of sample
were 14 or younger.
About 20% had a prior
referral for a status
offence, & 15% had a
prior referral for a
delinquent offence
Enhanced supervision
(several contacts per day)
No long term difference
between groups over 3
years
Post custody parole in
Texas (Turner &
Petersilia, 1992)
Random assignment of
679 cases (ISP &
control)
Average age of 31 years.
Average of 8–9 prior
arrests & 6–8 prior
convictions. 85% had
served at least two
prison terms. Nearly all
classified as high risk
9- to 12-month
programme with an
average of 6.5 & 4.8
contacts per month
ISP was not associated
with a reduction in
arrests & there was an
increase in technical
violations
Probation or parole for
drug offenders in
Washington, Iowa, New
Mexico, Georgia, &
Virginia (Petersilia,
Turner, & Deschenes,
1992)
Random assignment of
281 ISP cases & 268
control cases
Mean ages ranged from
26–30 years across the
sites. More than two-
thirds were of high or
moderate risk. The
majority were drug
dependent
The average contacts
ranged from three to
twenty three (surveillance,
urine analysis, drug
treatment & counselling)
In a 1-year follow up
period, 11% to 48% of
ISP offenders were
arrested for new crimes.
No significant
differences were found
between the ISP and
control groups
Intensive Supervision in
Ohio County (Weibush,
1993)
Comparison between
ISP youth & a matched
group committed to the
Ohio Department of
Youth Services
Juvenile felony offenders Mix of surveillance and
treatment techniques
No significant
differences in recidivism
among the groups &
ISP group had higher
technical violations than
routine probationers or
parolees
Parole for young
offenders in Colorado,
Virginia & Nevada
(Weibush et al., 2005)
Random assignment of
230 Intensive Aftercare
Programme (IAP) cases
& 205 control cases
The young offenders
were at high risk of
reoffending. In Nevada,
two-thirds had 11 or
more prior referrals,
80% had a prior
commitment to secure
care, & 55% were gang
members
Small IAP specific
caseloads &
individualised case
planning
No significant
differences between
groups
Figure 1
Evaluations of intensive
supervision programmes
studies from the US
(Adapted from Moore,
Gray, Roberts, Taylor & 
Merrington, 2006
pp. 39–41)
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Evidence from the UK
Some commentators have suggested that
English intensive supervision programmes
are more advanced than that of their foreign
counterparts. For instance Moore et al.
(2006, p. 42) state that, ‘Generally speaking
. . . programmes in England and Wales have
tended to be of greater intensity, and the
need for some form of treatment/
rehabilitation has been more consistently
applied’. It would therefore be expected
that the overall results from UK ISPs would
be more positive than those from the US.
However, as shown in Figure 2, this is not
Programme Sample size Offender profiles Programme structure Outcomes
Intensive Matched
Probation and After
Care Treatment
(IMPACT) (Folkard,
Smith & Smith, 1976)
Random assignment of
244 experimental cases
& 161 control cases
Two-thirds to three-
quarters were aged
17–29. Many had been
placed on probation
before
Officer caseloads
reduced from 40–45
cases to approximately
20 cases. Emphasis upon
situational treatment
with more direct
involvement in the areas
of family, work and
leisure
No significant
differences in 1 & 2 year
reconviction rates. This
study was instrumental in
raising doubts about the
effectiveness of intensive
supervision (Raynor &
Vanstone, 2002)
Hereford & Worcester
Young Offender Project
(YOP) (Roberts, 1989)
YOP sample (n = 53) &
2 comparison groups
who received custody
(n = 56 & 51)
Offenders 17–20 yrs, all
unemployed.
Intensive programme of
supervision & activity
(social skills training,
group work etc)
Reconviction results
show that there was a
short-term benefit for
the 2 custodial groups
Intensive Probation (IP)
for young adult
offenders (Leeds)
(Brownlee & Joanes,
1993; Brownlee, 1995)
227 IP cases compared
with a custodial group
of unknown size
Unknown An eight week
individualised
programme (One-to-one
counselling, offending
behaviour & social skills
sessions)
73% of a small sub-
sample (n = 45)
reconvicted over a two-
year follow-up period
Intensive Probation (IP)
for young adult
offenders (Mair et al,
1994)
1,677 offenders referred
to IP. No comparison
group
51% had more than five
previous convictions &
54% had previous
experience of custody
Individualised
programmes involving
frequent contact with a
project worker & an
emphasis upon
confronting offending
behaviour
Inconclusive: IP worked
well in some areas and
not in others
Intermediate Treatment
(IT) and Heavy-End
Intermediate Treatment
(HEIT) for young
offenders (Bottoms,
1995)
103 Heavy-End IT
(HEIT) cases, 40 other
IT cases, 141 custody
cases & 142 straight
Supervision Order cases
Mean age was 15.7
years. For the HEIT
group, the average
number of charges/
convictions in the prior
14 months was 7
Varied between sites,
however emphasis upon
tracking with weekly
meetings. (Group and
individual work, social
skills & various constructive
activities)
There was no ‘automatic
or necessary
relationship’ between
HEIT & custody levels
ISSP Kent (Variant
forerunner to ISSP)
(Little et al., 2004)
Randomly allocated to
ISSP or standard
services. 24 ISSP cases
& 24 control cases & 31
matched cases
Offenders 15–17 years
old: offenders charged
or cautioned on three
or more occasions with
a 12-month period with
an imprisonable offence
Multi-systemic, four
compulsory components
& three ancillary
components
87% reconvicted after 2
years & no differences
between groups
Probation for young
adult offenders:
Intensive Control &
Change Programme
(ICCP) (Partridge et al.,
2005)
433 ICCP cases. No
comparison group
Offenders had an
average of 27 previous
convictions, & a
medium to high risk of
reoffending.
A minimum of 25 hours
of contact per week for
first three months
(mandatory curfews with
electronic tagging, 5 core
supervision components,
encompassing behaviour
programmes, supervision
and training etc)
26% of offenders had
their orders revoked or
terminated & a further
27% breached the
programme
Figure 2
Evaluations of intensive
supervision programmes
in England & Wales
(Adapted from Moore,
Gray, Roberts, Taylor &
Merrington, 2006,
pp. 58–60)
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the case. Again, the results of most of these
evaluations were available before the intro-
duction of ISSP in E&W in 2001.
In short, the findings from both sides of
the Atlantic are overwhelmingly negative,
with high reconviction and breach rates.
Indeed, Fulton, Latessa, Stichman, and
Travis (1997) argue that the blanket condi-
tions placed on ISP offenders, plus stringent
breach procedures, actually compound
prison overcrowding and increase costs.
This suggests that the ISSP in E&W may
even work against the YJB’s own perform-
ance measure of reducing youth custody.
Subsequent commentators have stressed the
need to provide ‘quality contact’, not just
more ‘supervision contact’ (Goodstein &
Sontheimer, 1997; Nee & Ellis, 2005).
Given the poor performance of ISPs and
the wealth of evaluations evidencing this,
the obvious question is: on what evidence
was the introduction of ISSP in 2001 based?
According to Green, Grove, and Martin
(2005), the answer appears, worryingly, to
be: on the results of a very small pilot
scheme, that is, the ‘Rotherham Intensive
Supervision, Support and Advocacy Pro-
gramme’ (RISSAP), carried out in August
2000. RISSAP evaluated 27 young
offenders who were convicted of 160
offences in the 9 months before the inter-
vention, but committed only 47 offences
during the programme supervision period.
The full evaluation of this small interven-
tion has never been published. However,
Green et al. claim that in the final analysis,
35 offenders in the programme group were
compared with 18 offenders in a ‘compar-
ison’ group, and that 7 per cent fewer of the
former had reoffended. Given the weight of
evidence of so many evaluations of much
higher quality outlined above, it is not hard
to accept Green et al.'s criticism that the
RISSAP evaluation was not scientifically
rigorous enough as a basis for the national,
multi-million pound roll-out of ISSP.
Despite the complexities and differences
of the evaluations profiled above, it seems
clear that the balance of the evidence is
overwhelmingly against intensive super-
vision, however it may be configured. As
Gendreau, Goggin, Cullen, and Andrews
(2000, p. 11) argue, ‘ISPs have had little
effect on offenders’ future criminal activity
above what would occur by chance’. In
addition to this evidence, by 2001 there
were many separate international warnings
that intensive supervision was likely to be
abandoned due to its poor performance
(Byrne, 1990; Clear, Flynn, & Shapiro,
1987; Stone & Fulton, 1995). Proponents
of ISSP might argue that RISSAP repre-
sented a new, youth-focused approach that
was not bound by previous models of
intensive supervision. However, the results
of the YJB's own independently commis-
sioned evaluations, as outlined below, sug-
gest otherwise.
YJB COMMISSIONED EVALUATIONS
OF ISSP
On the back of RISSAP, ISSP was intro-
duced in 2001. The independent evaluators
themselves, Moore et al. (2006, p. 71), state
that ‘the [ISSP in E&W] is far more intens-
ive than many of its predecessors and seeks
to deliver an appropriate balance between
control and care’. One would therefore
expect their findings to be positive. How-
ever, YJB press releases aside, this is not the
case.
The YJB commissioned an independent
impact evaluation of ISSP in two stages
(Gray et al., 2005, p. 19; Moore et al.,
2004), covering the first 41 schemes across
England and Wales. The design and content
of these early ISSPs varied significantly,
itself a challenge to the evaluation (Gray et
al., p. 9). In reading these evaluations, and
their related press releases, it is often hard to
distinguish between public relations content
and academic evaluation. Indeed, while a
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2004 press release claimed ISSP had suc-
cessfully reduced reoffending (YJB, 2004),
this was clearly a partial and misleading
view, as the evaluation itself showed ISSP
did not outperform any of the comparison
samples (Moore et al.; Gray et al.).
Sampling and comparison sizes
Sampling for the YJB evaluation was par-
ticularly difficult, due to the severe and
persistent nature of the target offenders,
who could only be included in the analysis
if they had been at liberty for 12–24
months. This resulted in a loss of cases and it
must be doubted whether the number was
sufficient.
The main impact findings from the inde-
pendent ISSP evaluations are outlined
below.
The impact of the ISSP on the use of
custody
ISSP was not launched as an alternative to
custody, but was later given that aim (YJB,
2003, p. 3). Between April 2000 and
December 2004, YJB’s national data showed
a 2.1 per cent reduction in juvenile custody.
However, during the evaluation period,
reductions took place in both ISSP and
non-ISSP areas, probably due to a range of
national policies and initiatives to reduce
juvenile imprisonment (Gray et al., 2005,
p. 10).
Reconviction rates
The overall ISSP 12-month reconviction
rate was 89 per cent, and the 24-month
reconviction rate was 91 per cent (Gray et
al., 2005, p. 27). These rates varied accord-
ing to the type of intervention (Table 2),
but such results can, at best, be regarded as
very poor, and at worst, as a failure. It was
not possible to compare actual and expected
rates over two years because at that time
Asset2 was only validated to predict
12-month reconviction rates (Gray et al.,
pp. 59, 136).
Reductions in frequency and
seriousness of offending
Gray et al. (2005) and YJB press releases
focused more heavily on ISSP reductions in
the frequency (40 per cent) and seriousness
(13 per cent) of offending, than on the
disappointing overall reoffending rate
above. Indeed, the results looked initially
promising. However, when compared with
the community comparison groups used by
Gray et al., ISSP performed slightly worse.
Even the evaluators noted that these reduc-
tions were partly attributed to ‘regression to
the mean’ (see Cook & Campbell, 1979)
and partly to not being able to establish
good comparison groups (Gray et al.,
p. 51). This is hardly strong enough evid-
ence for a ringing endorsement of the
impact of ISSP.
Table 1: Total sample sizes of ISSP cases,
and comparison groups: 12 and
24-month evaluations
ISSP Comparison
12-month reconviction sample 2,842 1,112
24-month reconviction sample 943 510
Source: Gray et al. (2005, p. 51).
Table 2: Actual and expected 12-month
reconviction rates with comparison
sample
Expected
rates
Actual
rates
Actual rates of
comparison
sample
Bail ISSP 80% 92% NA
SO/CRO ISSP‡ 79% 88% 84%
DTO ISSP 80 91 76
All ISSPs 79 89 –
Notes:
‡ SO= Supervision Order; CRO= Community
Rehabilitation Order; DTO=Detention and Training Order.
Source: Gray et al. (2005, p. 27).
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Effectiveness of ISSP as perceived by
staff, young offenders and their
families
Evaluators also focused on the positive feed-
back from 173 young offenders, 33 parents
and 144 staff members, where there was
praise for the capacity of ISSP staff to
identify and focus on welfare needs (Gray et
al., 2005, p. 125). However, the evaluators
also found examples of homelessness,
unmet mental health and special educa-
tional needs, poor social work intervention,
and obstacles with education, training and
external services (Gray et al., p. 141).
12-month duration ISSP ‘pilot study’
A longer, 12-month version of ISSP was
piloted later in 11 areas, showing an even
lower completion rate (32 per cent) than
the 6-month version (42 per cent) (Suther-
land et al., 2007, p. 13). Of most concern in
terms of public protection, the average
number of non-compliances per offender
was extremely high at 27 (Sutherland et al.,
pp. 100–101).
The YJB’s own findings on ISSP
effectiveness
Overall, the reconviction results do not
show that ISSP outperformed any of the
comparison samples (Gray et al., 2005,
p. 136). With low completion rates, high
reconviction rates, and no concrete evid-
ence of success, it is surprising that the
scheme has not received more criticism
from academics (Green et al., 2005) and the
press (eg, Slack, 2007). The YJB’s own
evaluations offer a significant contribution
to the evidence base on intensive super-
vision of young offenders in England and
Wales. However, they in no way offer a
departure from the findings of the high
quality international evidence base outlined
above. Indeed, in less prominent parts of
their published reports, the independent
evaluators have stated, ‘even though a num-
ber of methods were used, it proved diffi-
cult to establish if the ISSP has a beneficial
impact on offending’ (Moore et al., 2004,
p. 321). In the later study, they also noted
that ‘overall, the results to date at both 12
and 24 months do not show that col-
lectively ISSP outperformed the compar-
ison samples’ (Gray et al., 2005, p. 136).
The positive gloss put on these results both
in the evaluation reports and in the YJB
press releases was easy to rub off. In The
Times, Gibb and Ford (2005) argued
unequivocally that, ‘when the main show is
such a staggering flop . . . it takes some
cheek to crow about the lighting’.
There is little doubt, on the balance of
the evidence presented so far, that the YJB
should have been aware of the likely inef-
fectiveness of ISSP on reoffending. But
should it not also have considered the ram-
ifications of ISSP for public protection? It is
very striking that we could not find any
discussion of public protection on the YJB
website up to September 2007. Therefore,
we decided to focus our own independent
Table 3: Reductions in frequency and seriousness of offending: results after 12 and 24
months with comparison sample
All ISSPs 12 months Community comparison
12 months
All ISSPs 24 months Community comparison
24 months
Frequency –40% –42% –39% –39%
Seriousness –13% –16% –13% –15%
Source: Gray et al. (2005, pp. 61–69).
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empirical research on: the extent to which
ISSP’s poor performance can be attributed
to a flawed concept of intervention, or to
implementation failure and/or poor prac-
tice; and the extent to which public protec-
tion is considered in the supervision
process.
ISSP IN PRACTICE: 2 YOT AREA
CASE STUDIES
The findings from evaluations of intensive
supervision in general, and ISSP in particu-
lar, indicate that there is a gap in knowl-
edge. We know ISSP performs relatively
poorly in terms of reducing reoffending,
but we do not know why. We therefore
negotiated access to two contrasting YOTs,
and designed an in-depth primary research
study to address this.
Methods
The bedrock of our triangulated approach
(see Robson, 2002) was in-depth particip-
ant observation, for six months in mid-
2007, by one of the authors working as a
part-time ISSP supervisor in YOT Area 1.
This yielded a considerable depth of qual-
itative data and represents a new point of
comparison with previous studies. Since
participant observation is open to potential
subjectivity and lack of generalisability, we
also negotiated access to the additional,
much larger YOT Area 2. We then carried
out semi-structured interviews and admin-
istered questionnaires with both ISSP staff
and ISSP participants in both YOT areas. All
methods were integrated sequentially, so
that the literature review, personal practice
and observations were used first to compile
semi-structured interview schedules, and
then questionnaires (see Table 4 for a
summary).
We felt that, within available resources,
this was the best approach to studying
whether or not the ISSP design is well
matched to its overall aims. Although the
numbers are not large, they represent a large
proportion of staff and offenders in the
YOT areas. It is also important to stress that
this is not a direct comparison of two YOT
areas, as they are of differing size, manage-
ment structure and operation. However, the
inclusion of two YOTs adds rigour to the
research that analogous published studies on
YOT intervention often do not provide (eg,
Burnett & Appleton, 2004).
We were keen to ensure that the
offender’s voice was central to the research
process. From Matza (1969) onward, there
have been criticisms that this is relatively
rare. Most recently, Moore (2007) recom-
mended that more attention should be paid
to offenders’ perceptions of their own like-
lihood of reoffending. It was striking that
our young offenders had a very positive
approach, both to our research approach
and instruments, but especially to being
asked for their opinions. We had anticipated
some difficulties with the more structured
questionnaires, but the offenders were gen-
erally enthusiastic and approached the task
with detachment and honesty.
Findings
The separate questionnaires for staff and for
offenders were developed, as far as possible,
with ‘matched’ statements. These statements
were in a logical, progressive order, and
Table 4: Number, type of participants
and methods used by YOT area
YOT
Area 1
YOT
Area 2
ISSP staff 7 20
ISSP young offenders 17 11
Participant observations (staff
and offender supervision) √ ×
Questionnaires (staff and
offenders) √ √
Semi-structured interviews (staff
and offenders) √ ×
Ellis, Pamment and Lewis
Page 401
were designed so that groups of four to five
questions were combined to form broader
ISSP topic section scores under the fol-
lowing key headings: ISSP as a concept;
organisation and communication; targeting
appropriate offenders; addressing individual
needs; public protection by surveillance;
public protection by preventing further
offending; impact measures; breach pro-
ceedings; ISSP as an alternative to custody;
and reasons for non-completion. Respond-
ents were also given a chance to provide
further qualitative information. To avoid
anticipated difficulties with offender literacy
and attitudes to educational work, we used
a Likert scale-based questionnaire largely as
the basis of an ‘interview’. All data have
been regularised so that a score of 7 repre-
sents the most positive response and a score
of 1 the least.
Conceptualising ISSP: organisation
and communication
The 28 young offenders were largely pos-
itive about ISSP as an idea for intervention
(M = 5.5) as were the 27 ISSP staff
(M = 6.4).
Offenders were then asked about ISSP
‘organisation and communication’. This was
measured by six statements, on whether:
ISSP was fully explained at the outset of the
programme; offenders understood what was
expected of them; organisation had been
good; offenders felt able to discuss problems
with ISSP staff; offenders were able to
communicate with their caseworkers; and
whether ISSP was of appropriate length.
The overall mean score for the 28 young
offenders was 5.3, indicating that YOT ser-
vice delivery and communication was rated
as good.
These results would suggest that ISSP
practitioners are performing well, and that,
as a general principle, the ISSP approach is
valued by both participants and staff alike.
We therefore need to look elsewhere for an
explanation of the overall poor performance
of ISSP.
ISSP targeting of appropriate
offenders and addressing individual
needs
Offenders responded to one statement
regarding their suitability for an ISSP and
they responded with a weakly positive mean
score of 4.6. However, seven respondents
qualified this by saying that their offences
were so severe that they should have
received an immediate custodial sentence,
eg, ‘I have done really bad stuff and I should
have gone to custody’. The ISSP staff pro-
duced a very similar weakly positive score
of 4.8. However, their qualitative responses
had a different focus. Age was the common
factor for 10 of the 27 practitioners: eg,
A lot of times we have had older
offenders, say 17ish. By then, I just think
it is too late. They know the system more
than I do and it is impossible to change
them.
By the time ISSP is given, the young
person is so into offending that stopping
them from reoffending, or even slowing
down the offending rate, is unlikely.
Young offenders were then asked to
respond to whether ISSP addresses their
individual needs. An overall negative mean
rating of 3.2 was explained by some of their
comments: four different 17-year-old
offenders made very similar points about
the age-inappropriate intervention packages
available:
I was given a school bullying pack to do
when I was not even at school; the
interventions are all based on the same
thing.
I have to do teen talk packs which are
really childish and nothing to do with
me.
Public protection in youth justice?
Page 402
I was made to play with plastic men and
told to move them through an ima-
ginative grand chamber of feelings. I was
embarrassed coz I was nearly 18.
This is a very serious issue for programme
delivery. The mean age of the 17 young
offenders from Area 1 was 16.4 (higher than
the joining age of the British Army) and the
age range was narrow, from 15 to 17, with a
profile of offences including grievous bodily
harm, robbery and burglary. Much of the
programme content was designed for a
younger age group, and with an uncertain
evidence base. Supervision experience
showed them to be very streetwise, experi-
enced in youth justice and sensitive to being
‘talked down to as kids’.
Young offenders also noted the low level
of participatory effort required, eg, ‘You just
go there and sit down, get spoken to and
then go home. The hardest part of the
supervision is getting out of bed.’
The overall YOT staff response to the
same issue was a straight neutral score of 4,
but analysis shows that this masks the fact
that staff in Area 1 had a relatively positive
view (5.1), while staff in Area 2 had a
weakly negative view (3.8) (see Table 5).
Oddly, whilst the young offenders’ views
were weakly negative in Area 2, it is not
very distant from the almost neutral staff
view (3.8), but in Area 1, there is a large gap
between staff ’s positive view (5.1) and the
young offenders’ very negative one (2.4).
Whilst the numbers are small, it seems that
there is likely to be a much larger disagree-
ment over the extent to which staff and
offenders think that ISSP addresses indi-
vidual needs in many different YOT areas,
and that this variation will be missed by a
'national' study. If ISSP is to be rescued (and
we contend that it cannot be), it will
require a much greater evaluative focus on
variations in practice and performance by
area, and controlling for any potential data
manipulation.
With these general issues established, we
turned our attention to the extent to which
ISSP offered genuine public protection
from serious and persistent offenders.
Public protection through ISSP
surveillance
Young offenders were asked to respond to
two statements about the overall surveil-
lance element of the programme: ‘whether
YOT staff knew their whereabouts at all
times’; and, ‘whether they felt ISSP resulted
in intensive monitoring’. The response
scores were very similar and these were
combined to provide an overall ‘ISSP sur-
veillance’ rating. The resulting low mean of
2.6 is a disturbing finding in terms of the
level of public protection provided. Young
offenders clearly thought they were subject
to a low level of scrutiny and the qualitative
responses suggest why, eg, ‘The staff know
where I am for only a few hours a day and
then they don’t know shit’.
Criticisms about the effectiveness and
appropriateness of tagging are not new.
There has been widespread and sustained
academic criticism of this surveillance ele-
ment (see Shute, 2007), and the press often
focus on catastrophic youth justice results
(Maynard, 2007). However, we still found a
higher level of tagging inadequacies than
anticipated, with nine offenders questioning
this surveillance element, eg:
Tag would only work if someone was to
come and get us back straight away every
Table 5: ISSP addressing individual
needs: mean scores by YOT area and
respondent type
Participants Area 1
mean
(n) Area 2
mean
(n) Combined
mean
Staff 5.1 (7) 3.8 (20) 4.0
Offenders 2.4 (17) 4.5 (11) 3.2
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time we breached it, but nothing hap-
pens for ages.
Tags are so easy to get off your ankle and
they are shit anyway; nobody knows
where I am when I leave my house even
when I have it on.
YOT staff were asked to respond to an
equivalent statement on whether they felt
young offenders were ‘intensively mon-
itored enough to ensure that they did not
have the opportunity to reoffend’. They
answered with a weakly negative mean
score of 3.6, and it is clear from their
qualitative answers that they were less
focused on the tagging element and more
concerned about the overall level of surveil-
lance, eg:
It is impossible to monitor to a sufficient
level unless we are standing beside them
24 hours a day. If they want to reoffend
they will.
Let’s face it; the ISSP is not intensive at
all, 25 hrs a week isn’t even a part-time
job.
National standards say that we should
have face-to-face contact everyday. This
cannot be done in reality due to staff and
resource constraints, especially not on a
Sunday, and I don’t know any YOT that
can facilitate such standards. There is the
YJB official line, and then there is what
everyone does.
There are also practical difficulties, suggest-
ing that the ISSP design is not appropriate
in either area. In Area 1, a small team of
ISSP staff cover a large geographical area:
It is normal to drive over 50 miles to see
an offender. We are chasing the kids and
they don’t have to put much effort in.
There is not enough emphasis that this is
an official order. How can we intensively
supervise someone from such a
distance?
There was also staff frustration with regard
to tagging breaches and this serves as a
check against potential exaggeration and
bravado from the young offenders. With
similar overtones to HM Inspectorate of
Probation’s (2005) investigation into the
YOT supervision of Peter Williams, who
was involved in the murder of Marian Bates
in 2003, one ISSP manager stated:
To the private security staff, offenders are
just names on a computer and there is no
sense of responsibility. It is important for
us to know where all our kids are for
public safety. [Named security company]
just don’t let us know anything, and it
has gone on for years.
Whilst the tag is a key element of what the
YJB presents as consistent and rigorous sur-
veillance to reassure the public (Gray et al.,
2005, p. 27), in our research areas it appears
that tags represent a challenge to be man-
aged effectively, rather than a punishment
or restraint. The most concerning aspect of
tagging is the powerlessness of the YOT in
the immediate aftermath of a breach. Any
technological difficulties are secondary to
those caused by an ineffective information
management process and the combined
inability to react quickly.
Public protection through preventing
further offending
Young offenders were also asked to respond
to a statement on ‘whether the ISSP pro-
tects the public from offending’. The result
was a very negative mean score of 2.0. The
following comments typified the general
feeling:
The ISSP does not protect the public for
shit.
It don’t stop me from doing any criminal
shit, so it don’t protect no one.
This is not surprising, perhaps, given the
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findings on ISSP surveillance above (and on
ISSP impact below).
These findings suggest that the ISSP is
having neither the desired incapacitative
effect, nor the claimed consistent and rigor-
ous supervision and surveillance (Gray et
al., 2005, p. 27), and therefore offers little
guarantee of protection to the public.
Eight offenders stated that they offended
to a high degree while under ISSP super-
vision, eg:
Since being on the ISSP the last three
times, I have committed over a hundred
offences, mostly commercial burglaries.
What good does it do? ISSP takes you
out of the community for a few hours
and then chucks you straight back.
The ISSP is not a big part of my life. You
just tell YOT workers what they want
to hear and then it’s well easy to get
through a session, even though it’s bull-
shit! After the meeting you just carry on
as normal.
The YOT supervisors’ overall response
(M = 3.3) indicates that they would not be
too surprised at this picture and are perhaps
realistic about ISSP impact.
More worrying still was the fact that in
staff meetings to review individual cases,
public protection was rarely discussed.
Indeed, in the case of one young offender,
convicted of a serious robbery, an ISSP
supervisor stated that: ‘We need to wait for
him to reoffend and then he will go into
the adult system’.
It seems that the bureaucratic exigencies
of the job (Ellis & Boden, 2005) and a
rather battle-weary attitude mean that risk
to the public is largely unacknowledged in
the ISSP supervision process. The following
comment typified the general feeling of
ISSP supervisors:
We are dealing with severe offenders and
it is inevitable that they are going to
reoffend, usually multiple times. We are
powerless to stop them because we are
only with them for a small amount of
time.
ISSP impact on reconviction
From the outset, we knew that ISSP recon-
viction rates were extremely high,3 and that
seriousness and frequency of reoffending,
while reduced, were higher than in the
comparison groups (Gray et al., 2005).
However, ISSP staff argued that a focus on
reconvictions alone may not provide a fair
reflection of ISSP success. We therefore also
explored other measures of ISSP success
that were derived from YOT staff and par-
ticipants’ views expressed in the observa-
tional work.
The offender questionnaire used five
statements about the overall impact of ISSP
supervision. For most of this analysis, these
were combined into a single impact variable.
For offenders, the overall impact mean score
was 3.1, indicating a low overall perceived
impact. The component mean scores were
telling here: ‘whether ISSP had stopped
further offending’ (2.8); ‘whether ISSP will
improve life chances’ (2.9); ‘whether parti-
cipants benefited in any way from the ISSP’
(3.2); ‘whether ISSP had a positive impact
upon offenders’ attitudes to offending’
(3.4); and ‘whether ISSP had a positive
impact on behaviour’ (3.5). As one, not
untypical offender stated: ‘You lot won’t
fucking change me, I am a criminal and a
fucking good one. I hang with my boys and
this is what we do, we are gangsters’.
The staff questionnaire carried five com-
parable statements about the impact of the
ISSP, with a weaker overall negative mean
impact score of 3.9. While YOT staff felt that
ISSP was a relatively positive approach to
improving the life chances of offenders
(4.8), none of the other responses went
above neutral (4). Indeed, there were clearly
negative ratings for whether ISSP stops
young people from offending (3.0) and for
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whether ISSP effectively controls the
behaviour of young offenders (3.5).
Although expressed differently, the staff ’s
views were largely similar in content to
those of the young offenders. The following
comments, from two managers, suggest
little naivety about ISSP: ‘If you think the
ISSP can stop these offenders from further
offending then you are mistaken, but we
can give them a chance’, and ‘ISSP is not a
miracle cure and it cannot stop offending’.
We were unable to access Area 1 recon-
viction figures, so it is important to note
that: 10 of the 17 offender respondents here
failed to complete the ISSP; three were
still under supervision: and of the four
that completed, three have subsequently
reoffended. Area 2 achieved slightly lower
reconviction rates than the YJB national
study: 82 per cent for a cohort tracked for
12 months in 2005, and 85 per cent for a
cohort tracked for 24 months.
ISSP breach proceedings
Tagging aside, strict enforcement and com-
pliance are key elements stressed by YJB in
making ISSP effective for public protection
and reassurance. Indeed, ISSP has fast-track
arrangements so that breaches are dealt with
quickly (YJB, 2002, p. 8). Hedderman and
Hough’s (2004) research on adult offenders
supports this approach, while others have
questioned the effectiveness of such man-
agerialist approaches to enforcement (see
Ellis, 2000). Indeed, Hearnden and Millie
(2004) later found that stricter enforcement
was not synonymous with better results,
and this again raises the question of what
enforcement is expected to achieve. As
noted above, stricter enforcement may sim-
ply increase the proportion of young
offenders in custody (Fulton et al., 1997).
We therefore asked offenders and ISSP
staff about the extent to which enforcement
is a deterrent, and whether it was effective
in ensuring compliance with ISSP condi-
tions. We then also asked them about their
attitudes to custody.
The results showed that offenders ‘were
concerned about receiving a breach’ (4.8),
they ‘felt that it mattered if they missed
appointments’ (5.3) and they were clear that
‘there would be repercussions if they were
breached’ (4.5). This gives a relatively
encouraging picture of the deterrent and
retributive potential of enforcement pro-
cesses, and of offenders’ understanding of
the terms of ISSP. However, when
offenders responded to the statement about
the ‘promptness of breach action leading to
a return to custody’, the mean score was
3.2. It seems that a high potential fear of
enforcement action is being undermined
by ineffective procedural application.
Offenders’ qualifying comments also con-
firm that fast-tracking of breaches remains
aspirational:
Everyone knows how long it takes to get
breached on the ISSP and everyone plays
the system.
You get a warning and nothing happens
for ages. I have missed loads of appoint-
ments and I reckon that I have had about
8 final warnings!
Interestingly, the YOT staff thought that
they enforced ISSPs effectively, with a mean
score of 5.1. Their qualifying comments
suggest that delays were caused by the time
it takes to get a court date: ‘It’s not uncom-
mon for it to take two to three weeks to
get a court date, which is not good if you
have a high risk offender within the
community.’
Others, however, had ambiguous atti-
tudes to breach action, and the range of
approaches was very similar to findings on
the level of discretion used in adult pro-
bation supervision over a decade ago (see
Ellis, Hedderman, & Mortimer, 1996):
What do you define as a breach? I deal
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with kids that leave home for days on
end, and I don’t constitute a few hours
late as a breach!
If we breached kids for missing appoint-
ments every time, none of them would
get through the programme.
From a welfare perspective, this may well be
laudable, but from a justice perspective
(Canton & Eadie, 2005, p. 147), it leaves
further doubts about public protection and
helps explain Sutherland et al.’s (2007,
pp. 100–101) finding, referred to above, of
a mean of 27 non-compliances per
offender.
ISSP as an alternative to custody
Offenders were asked whether they ‘per-
ceived the ISSP to be a good alternative to
custody’. The resulting overall mean score
(5.4) seemed very positive, suggesting that
despite the low impact, surveillance, and
public protection scores, offenders rated
ISSP highly. However, the qualitative find-
ings show that offenders were responding to
what was the most attractive option to
them. The following comments typified the
general feeling of ISSP respondents:
The ISSP is nicer than custody and
everyone is going to say that. The ISSP is
good for us, because we can see our
mates.
I got away with it when I got the ISSP
and everyone says the same thing.
When talking about the achievement of
ISSP aims, rather than offender preferences,
six offenders actually argued that custody
was more likely to be beneficial than the
ISSP in reducing reoffending in the long
term:
In prison they work on the future, but
on the ISSP they concentrate on the
past. Prison has an impact on your per-
sonality and it sticks in your head.
I have done better in prison because the
boundaries are clear. I also got qualifica-
tions inside and I have got none on ISSP.
I think the ISSP is pointless because you
don’t come away with anything.
The observational work showed that there
was a fairly complex discourse at work here.
In comparing ISSP reconviction rates with
those of youth custody (just below 80 per
cent for the 2004 cohort (Whiting &
Cuppleditch, 2006)), there is little to
choose. It would be easy, therefore, to dis-
count offenders’ views. However, what
they were advocating was a more nuanced
and instrumental approach, typically:
Prison is better because it takes you out
of your own town where you always get
into trouble coz of your mates. The ISSP
keeps you in the same place. I reckon
better education in prisons would be
better or just teach us a trade.
It was clear that the ideal for these offenders
was to be taken out of their current envir-
onment, to be taught job-related skills, and
crucially, to be ‘relocated’ away from their
original area, with continued support from
YOT, or equivalent staff. The question
remains here as to whether ‘custody’ is the
likely or necessary way to achieve this. It
seems that current community provision
through the ISSP is simply not addressing
offenders’ needs, but could be, for instance,
in the form of ‘intensive fostering’ or in
alternative sanctions available, such as
‘unpaid work’. The participant observation
threw up many conversations involving staff
and offenders, where there was a general
agreement that ‘unstructured lifestyle’ was
the biggest reason for non-completion of
ISSP. The key question then becomes: why
is ISSP failing to deliver on its ‘promise’ of
bringing organisation to an offender’s rou-
tine? (YJB, 2002, p. 5). It seems that the
design of the ISSP intervention simply does
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not tackle those issues well and, based on all
of the evidence presented above, never
will.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
ISSP is not achieving its anticipated success,
and the reasons seem clear. To begin with,
there is no convincing ‘evidence base’. The
review of previous evaluations of intensive
programmes shows, overwhelmingly, that
they do not work, especially in reducing
reconviction rates in the youth justice
context.
As Muncie (2004, p. 249) emphasises,
the varied 21st century discourses of pun-
ishment, diversion and retribution coexist
in an uneasy manner. ISSP forms part of
this uneasy melange, with aims that tend to
conflict: reducing reoffending and the
youth custody population, whilst providing
effective punishment that satisfies sentencers
and the public, and also reducing costs.
Solutions are unlikely to be simple. For
instance, increasing enforcement rigour will
only amplify breach levels, thus increasing
non-completion and ultimately increasing
reconvictions and imprisonment rates.
In short, ISSP has not: reduced predicted
reoffending; ensured adequate surveillance
to ensure public protection; ensured rigor-
ous enforcement; had a positive impact
upon offenders' attitudes; provided super-
vision sessions specific to individual needs
or offender age; improved young offenders’
life chances; ensured adequate incapacita-
tion; brought structure to young offenders’
lives; provided strong boundaries and separ-
ation from damaging environments or peer
groups. Essentially, ISSP in practice is a long
way from providing unprecedented levels of
surveillance, whilst meeting the expecta-
tions of the public that offenders are mon-
itored one-to-one, 24 hours a day and not
given the opportunity to reoffend (YJB,
2002, p. 3).
We are therefore left with a dilemma.
While ISSP is clearly inadequate to deal
with the demands of managing severe and
persistent young offenders in the commun-
ity, there is also much evidence from the
youth custody estate that bullying, suicides
and problems with restraint are endemic
(Carlile Inquiry, 2006; Faze, Benning &
Danesh, 2005; Goldson, 2006). Youth cus-
tody reconviction rates also fail to inspire
confidence. ISSP is certainly cheaper
(though it accounted for £32 million
between 2005 and 2007 (YJB, 2007,
p. 30), but relatively poor at protecting the
public.
Our evidence also suggests that offenders
do not see custody as a deterrent. However,
young offenders do have clear ideas about
what will reduce their offending, and these
chime well with much of the ‘what works’
evidence beyond cognitive behavioural pro-
grammes. Neither youth custody, nor ISSP
is effective for high risk offenders. Many of
our most serious or prolific offenders’ com-
ments might superficially seem to err
toward custody. However, these offenders
are, in effect, asking for their individual
needs to be better addressed away from their
current milieu, and to be taught job-related
skills, possibly in a secure training facility, but
in conjunction with supervision, mentoring
and other (not necessarily criminal justice-
based) support in the community.
Andrews (1995) has argued that ‘what
works’ intervention programmes can con-
tribute to a reduction in reoffending regard-
less of the setting and it was indeed striking
that many of our young offenders acknowl-
edged the benefits of secure care within this
study, not only for themselves but for soci-
ety. Neustatter (2002) has argued that some
offenders can even find custody a positive
experience and stresses that there should be
no taboo in discussing custody as a place for
some children. Whelan (2007) has also
argued that some offenders can enjoy the
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structure and opportunities that incarcera-
tion can provide.
Certainly, some of the most serious
offenders in this study suggested that initial
custody would be better and more bene-
ficial to them. However, there is an import-
ant coda here. Much of what they require
from ‘custody’, eg, job skills training, release
to a new area, suitable housing etc, is
unlikely to be able to be guaranteed at
present and can be provided through means
other than custody, if there is a will to do
so. The whole regime for dealing with such
offenders needs a radical and urgent over-
haul, and a review which focuses on the
evidence of what does work or is likely to
work, rather than on political expediency, is
long overdue. One of the most promising
avenues to explore may well be Ward and
Stewart’s (2003) ‘good lives’ model. How-
ever, perhaps ‘unpaid work’ or ‘community
service’ (CS) is an existing and underrated
alternative here. We are currently conduct-
ing a further study in Area 1 on CS, and the
emerging findings on the same topics
explored for ISSP are far more positive.
We also feel it is important to be clear on
our perspective regarding the mismatch
between the commitment of the ISSP staff,
and the tools which ISSP provides in order
to achieve its objectives. The words of an
ISSP worker excellently sum up the overall
qualitative observational findings within our
study:
I think the ISSP teams are truly com-
mitted people and I admire them for
their devotion. I believe that they are
working with one hand tied behind their
backs and the other one in a big woolly
mitten but still try for all they are worth
because they really want to make a
difference.
As with the enormous volume of intensive
supervision research that has gone before,
ISSP, unsurprisingly, has failed to display the
promise which the YJB, and New Labour,
anticipated. We feel that we have added to
the corpus of knowledge on ISSP and have
filled some of the gaps in knowledge cre-
ated by the YJB’s own studies. It is clear
that, from whatever perspective it is looked
at, using any triangulation of methods, ISSP
does not work. We have imported failure
from North America and used it to fill a
rhetorical need and in doing so, have put
people at risk. It is time to stop flogging the
dead horse!
NOTES
(1) Covering England and Wales only.
(2) The structured actuarial assessment tool
that supports youth justice supervision,
risk management in England and Wales
(see Baker, Jones, Roberts & Merring-
ton, 2002).
(3) At the time of writing (April 2008) we
discovered presentation slides on the
YJB website (see http://www.yjb.gov.
uk/NR/rdonlyres/E60A4C16-AB64-
4C70-A0E8 E3283B3D740B/0/ISSP
Conference2008YJBPresentations.pdf)
that claim a lower, though still high,
reconviction rate of 74 per cent for
ISSP. Furthermore, it is also claimed
that 59 per cent of offenders committed
less serious offences and 70 per cent
offended less frequently. We look for-
ward to the publication of the study on
which this was based in due course.
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